Abhidhamma has contributed specially in the field of phenomenology, theory of perception function of the consciousness and course of cognition. Phenomenology deals with the phenomena i.e. with the world of internal and external experience. It is explained in terms of senses that are liable to be perceived. It regards all that is in Universe as the subjective product of the living mind. In Abhidhamma philosophy, the phenomenology is the occurrence of the phenomena, which includes mind and matter (nāmarūpa) i.e. eighty-nine or one hundred and twenty one types of consciousness, fifty two kinds of psychic factors and twenty-eight types of material qualities. The phenomenology in the Abhidhamma tradition can be discussed by two complementary methods namely analysis of the states and investigating the relations (paccaya) of things.
In the Dhammasangani, the first book of the Abhidhamma Pitaka, the analysis of the states has been discussed.
The text starts with – ‘yasmim samaye kāmāvacaram kusalam cittam uppannam hoti somanassa sahagatam ñānasampayuttam, rūpārammanam saddārammanam gandhārammanam rasārammanam photabbārammanam va dhammārammanam vā yam yam va pana ārabbha, tasmin samaye phasso hoti vedanā hoti ye va pana tasmin samaye aññe pi atthi paticca samuppanne arūpino dhamme, ime dhamma kusalā.’
Here it is shown that even in the smallest psychic unit, that is, in a single moment of consciousness, a multiplicity of mental factors is active between which a certain relationship and interdependence must necessarily exist. Ācārya Buddhaghosa has considered the samaya in five ways namely samavāya, khana, kāla, samūha and hetu in Atthasālini. If samaya is rendered in the sense of samūha, the respective sentence would be in the sense of aggregation of things, since samūha points out to the totality of the dhammas such as contact (phassa) and feeling (vedanā), which are considered as conditions in producing a common result-
‘yo panesa phassavedanādinam dhammānam puñjo so idha samūha ti vibhāvato.
It should be noted, however, that the Patthāna-pakarana, the last and the seventh book of Abhidhamma Pitaka, is not so much concerned with the relations within a single psychic unit (citta-khana) but deals with the ‘external relations’, that is, with connections between several of such units. But these “external relations” are to a great extent dependent on the ‘internal relations’ of the given single unit or of previous ones, that is, on the modes of combination and the relative strength of the different psychic factors within a single moment of consciousness. TheVibhanga-pakarana discusses the dependent origination within a single moment of consciousness (ekacittakkhanika paticcasamuppāda), which indicates which of the twenty-four types of relations (paccayas) are applicable to which links of that momentary paticcasamuppāda. All phenomena are called sapaccayā (related to causes), sankhata (conditioned by causes) and paticcasamuppanna (arising from a conjecture of circumstances, because in arising and in standing they are conditioned by these twenty four causal relations. Of the twenty-four types of relations, fifteen relations are common to all the mental states.
The relationship between consciousness (citta) and psychic factors (cetasika) has been elaborated in the Abhidhamma Philosophy. Whenever a type of consciousness arises, it arises with a number of psychic factors. One cannot have even the conception of consciousness without them. But at the same time, all the fifty-two psychic factors are not available with all the eighty-nine or one hundred twenty one types of consciousness. Further it is said that psychic factors assume on essentially different form for us as soon as we decide to verbalize the inseparability between psychic factors and consciousness. Not only psychic factors perpetually take form at the same moment of its existence but also they contain and combine with consciousness in any moment. In reality, there is a perfect combination between the mental factors and consciousness; both grow together and fuse into a thoroughly concrete unity. This is peculiar principle to regard the inseparability in the mental phenomena from the Abhidhammic Buddhism.
Consciousness and its psychic factors are closely linked together and necessarily interdependent several empirical-theoretical senses. According to Ācārya Aniruddha “those inseparable mental states formed with consciousness are called as a combination where the arising of the consciousness is separate in the bondage to the other”-tesam cittaviyuttānam yathayogamito param, cittuppādesu paccekam sampayogo pavuccati.4 Here, the word cittāyutta signifies in the sense of ‘inseparable from consciousness’, i.e. mental states. Aniruddha explains the fifty-two types of psychic factors in the Abhidhammatthasangaho and says that these psychic factors are not conditioned through physical nature and are not depending upon it. However, all psychic factors are corresponding to consciousness in terms of the subsequent dominance, so they are related to real conditions that lie within nature itself. The relationship between psychic factors and consciousness is also a cooperative relationship of being conditioned between two kinds of realities, as psychic factors and consciousness both are not causal agents in a genuine sense. They are the indeterminate pictures of a common implication, from which continuous phenomena is to be constituted.
To explain psychic factors, it is said that sabbacittasādhārana, which are seven in number, namely phasso, vedanā, saññā, cetanā, ekaggatā, jīvitindriya, manasikara, are the ultimate bases of data of knowledge in the sense that they have not yet been determined within any conceptual system. They are associated with all the eighty-nine or one hundred twenty-one types of consciousness. The Pakinnaka cetasikas are associated with the consciousness of all the spheres but not with all types of consciousness. They are associated with some and not associated with other. They are six in number namely, Vitakka, Vicāra, Adhimokkha, Viriya, Pīti and Chanda. The fourteen Akusala-psychic factors are associated only with the twelve types of immoral consciousness. They twenty-five sobhana-psychic factors find their association with the fifty-nine or ninety one types of sobhanacittas available in four spheres of consciousness.
There are altogether fourteen types of functions, which are being performed by the consciousness or mind throughout the human life i.e. from entering into the womb of the mother (patisandhi) upto disconnection of the life process (cuti). Since these fourteen acts are being performed by our consciouseness, these are called citta-kiccāni. The fourteen types of functions are namely-
(i) Patisandhi,
(ii) Bhavanga,
(iii) Āvajjana,
(iv) Dassana,
(v) Savana,
(vi) Ghayāna,
(vii) Sāyana,
(viii) Phusana,
(ix) Sampaticchana,
(x) Santīrana,
(xi) Votthapana,
(xii) Javana,
(xiii) Tadālambana, and
(xiv) Cuti.
Patisandhi, Bhavanga and Cuti are allied functions, performed at different moments of time. Rebirth and death are performed once each in one’s lifetime. The function of patisandhi is performed at the time of conception, and the same consciousness has been taken over as bhavangacitta, which will continue for the rest of our lives until cuticitta replace it at death. Between rebirth and death in this existence there continues during all hours of deep sleep an unbroken stream of bhavanga-citta. During the rest of the time, every moment an activity is performed either by thought, word or deed, it is the citta vīthi (course of cognition) that functions. Each thought process is made up of seventeen thought moments (citta-khana), which perform varying functions. Each thought moment has three successive states like arising (uppāda), staying (thiti) and cessation (bhanga). The rapidity of the succession of such thought moments is so minute that it is hardly conceivable by the Ken of human understanding.
Phenomenology becomes a way of showing the essential involvement of human existence in the world starting with everyday perception. Its primary objective has been to take a fresh approach to a concretely experienced phenomenon through the direct investigation of the data of consciousness. Here, ‘phenomenon’ may be interpreted as ‘an object’. The term ‘object’ (ālambana) is defined as that where the states of consciousness and its constituents depend on. Further in the sense of ramana, it refers to that which is entertained by those mental states. The Buddhist theory of cognition has discussed the process of knowing the objects or phenomenon. It can be seen that full course of cognition (cittavīthi) at five door of senses has ten stages, beginning from Bhavanga to Tadālambana. The first three stages, namely Bhavanga, Bhavanga-calana, Bhavanga-viccheda are the preliminaries. Further there are seven types of consciousness, which happen to be in this process. Since, Javana is repeated for seven times and the Tadālambana twice, there is the arising of consciousness (cittuppāda) for fourteen times. The three preliminaries involve three thought moments and the fourteen times arising of consciousness (cittuppāda) contain fourteen thought-moments, making altogether seventeen thought moments to complete the full course of cognitions at five door of senses.5 In detail, there is the possibility of arising of fifty-four types of kamavacara-consciousness with above vīthis. It is said-
“vīthi cittāni satteva cittuppāda catuddasa catupaññāsa vitthārā pañcadvāre yathāraham.”6
It is to be noted that the speed of the matter is seventeen times less than that of the mind. The duration of life of a unit of matter are seventeen thought moments. A unit of matter appears as an object in the range of a sense organ and the course of cognition starts. By the time, the mind undergoes changes for seventeen times through different stages, the object remains in the same stage. At the end of seventeen thought moments, the full course of cognition is complete and the duration of the life of the matter also expires. Because, such difference in the speed of the two, there is the possibility of taking place of a course of cognition and thereby understanding of an object. Each small unit of time is called one thought moment (citta-khana) having three successive states like arising (uppāda), staying (thiti), and cessation (bhanga).7 When an object enters in the range of sense organ only one thought moment after its rise, there starts a course of cognition on it. It survives up to the Tadālambana stage and completes itself in further sixteen thought moments making seventeen in all. The life-moment of the object also expires at this stage. It is a full course of cognition technically known as Tadālambana-vāra. The object is fully cognized. It is called as ‘very distinct object’ or ‘ati mahanta-ālambana’8 Sometimes, the object appears in the range of a sense organ a bit late after it has taken its existence. It happens so because the impression of the object is not very clear. As such it does not survive up to the Tadālambana stage. It dies out in the middle of the course of cognition immediately after the end of Javana-consciousness. The course of cognition is named as Javana-vāra.9 Sometimes, the nature of the object is no doubt determined but neither it is utilized nor the experiences are recorded. In this circumstance, the cognition of the object is feeble. Such an object is called ‘Parittālambana’ or slight object. The course of cognition is called votthapana-vāra.10 In this way, the cognition of the object as very distinct, distinct, slight and very slight depends on the variation in survival of the course of cognition.
In Sarvastivada Abhidharma tradition, the phenomenology is the duality by a unique doctrine of two types of reality i.e. phenomenally real (samvrtisat) and substantially real (dravya-sat). Awareness of the former lumps together the ultimately discreet, atomic elements, concealing their real nature and revealing them as one unity. The latter are revealed only in our analytic awareness (prajñā), while they are also causally responsible for the perceptual awareness to arise.11 The Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma also contributed to a theory of direct perception by accepting the conception of a static moment. According to the Abhidharmadīpa-‘The substance called eye is of the nature of that which sees [a ‘seer’]. In it is produced an action of seeing when its power is awakened on account of the emergence of the totality of its causes and conditions. The eye does not apprehend independently of consciousness (vijñāna), nor does the eye-consciousness know the object unsupported by the active eye. The eye as well as eye-consciousness, with the help of such accessories as light, cooperates simultaneously toward beginning the perception of a given object. The object, eye, the eye-consciousness, and the light, all manifest their power i.e. become active and flash forth simultaneously. The object appears, the eye sees, and the eye –consciousness knows it. This is called the direct knowledge of an object.
Thus, the Sarvastivadins as well as the later Theravādins have attempted to justify direct perception as well as the real existence of the object. For this reason, they may be designated realists. Vaibhāsika points out that there is no real difference between ‘seeing’ and ‘knowing’, although we have such usages as the eye ‘sees’ or the mind ‘knows’. The Vaibhāsika seeks to support its point by referring to a sūtra:’cakshusa rupāni drstvā’. The Theravadin’s interpretation is identical with that of Kos’akāra. Ācārya Buddhaghosa in his magnum opus work clearly states that is the cakkhuviññāna which sees the rūpa and not the,
cakkhu-‘cakkhu rūpam na passati-acittakattā cittam na passati acakkhukattā, dvārārammanasanghatte pana cakkhuppasādavatthukena cittena passati.’
But, even the expression ‘consciousness knows’ is not to be taken literally, since there is no consciousness apart from knowing. The knowledge does not grasp, the eye does not see, the object does not offer itself to both. All dharmas being momentary are incapable of any activity; what we call action is nothing more than their coming into existence in a sequence determined by the law of pratītya-samutpāda. There is neither an actor, nor an action apart from the mere flash of dharmas.
The causal relation between the object and the consciousness forms one of the most intricate problems that confront the Buddhist theory of perception. The Buddhist is committed to a doctrine of radical momentariness of all things, both mind and matter. The Sautrantikas, who denied the conception of a static moment (sthitiksana) were, on the other hand, compelled to accept a theory of indirect perception. Going on the premise that an object must endure if it is to be available for cognition, the Sautrantikas maintained that, since both the object and conscousness are without duration, there cannot be direct perception of the external object. The commentary of the Abhidharmadīpa, refers to argument put forward by the Sautrantikas (Darstantikas) as follows-
“The organs and the objects of the five sense-consciousness, being causes of the latter, belong to a past moment. When the object (rūpa) and the eye exist, the visual consciousness is nonexistent. When visual consciousness exists, the eye and the object is non existing. In the absence of their duration (sthiti) there is no possibility of the cognition of the object.”
This led them to conclude that all (sense) perceptions are indirect (apratyaksa).16 The Sautrantikas held that the subject is capable of receiving an impression of the likeness of the object. What is directly cognized in this impression or representation of the object and not the object itself, which, by the time of cognition, is a thing of the past. The object is merely inferred on the basis of the sense impression. This is the representative theory of perception, or the theory of the inferability of the external object (bāhyārthanumeyavāda).
The Sautrantika by his theory of sākāra-jñānavāda (representative perception) paved the way for the emergence of the idealist Vijñānavāda. The external object was pushed into the background by maintaining that what was directly perceived was the content of the knowledge and not the object. “The object being always inferred, the content alone became real to the knowledge.”17 The Vijñānavādins goes a step further and maintains that the objects are mere ideal projections ideas alone are real.
Thus, it can be presumed in the light of the phenomenology in the Abhidhammic analysis that Theravada is right in insisting that every such choice of psychic factors involve a principle of psychological investigation and the Sarvāstivāda is right in insisting on the primacy of the epistemology or perception of the psychic factors are in the actual case before us. The phenomena are psychological primary sources of natural truth and give us abstract characteristics of our actual judgments in moral affairs. They enable us to correct the mental characters precisely because the recognition of what is essential in many cases helps us to distinguish the immoral and moral things in any phenomenon.
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